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RECENT CASES
Appeal and Error-Effect of Failure to Object to Erroneous Instructions at Trial-In three separate actions, consolidated for trial,
by owner of car for damage to his car and by driver of the car and passenger to recover for personal injuries, trial court left to jury the question
of driver's contributory negligence and instructed, without objection, that
if driver was contributorily negligent the owner could not recover.1 Verdict and judgment for all three plaintiffs. On appeal by defendant it was
held, driver was contributorily negligent as matter of law, and court's
instruction as to owner's right to recover, while erroneous, became law
of the case because not objected to, and required reversal of judgment for
owner and dismissal of his complaint. Buckin v. Long Island R. Co., 286
N. Y. 146, 36 N. E. (2d) 83 (1941).
Courts of review, in determining what trial rulings will be considered
as a ground for reversal or affirmance, generally refuse to consider questions which have not been raised and preserved in the trial courts.2 Rulings not questioned in the trial court are described as the "law of the
case." 8 The instant case considered the "law of the case"-an admittedly
erroneous instruction-as not open to question by the appellate court even
for the purpose of determining whether a new trial should be ordered or
the complaint dismissed. This is certainly a novel application of the doctrine.4 The refusal to consider questions not properly raised and preserved
often produces a result which is contrary to the substantive law, and the
application of the rule should therefore be strictly limited by the policy
factors which demand it. Various reasons are assigned for the rule, including the desirability of preventing interminable litigation 5 and the desire
of courts of review to be fair to trial courts. 6 But the only sound reason
for the rule is that a litigant should not be able deliberately to abstain
from objecting to and correcting errors in the trial so that he will have
a ground for obtaining a reversal in case the trial, goes against him. 7 However it is only where the rule is applied against an appellant, by refusing
to reverse on such errors, that it can be said to prevent such undesirable
i. This instruction was erroneous. Plaintiff's evidence indicated that the driver
and passenger were using the car for their own pleasure and not as plaintiff's agents.
In Mills v. Gabriel, 284 N. Y. 755, 31 N. E. (2d) 512 (1940) the New York Court
of Appeals had held that the negligence of the driver of an automobile driven with the
owner's permission but in his absence and not on his business may not be imputed to
the owner.
2. ELLIoTT, APPELLATE PRocFURE (1892) § 470; Note (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv.
997. 3.

For a discussion of the various situations in which the phrase "law
of the case"

is applied, see Lummus, "The Law of the Case" in Massachusetts (1929) 9 B. U. L.
REV. 225.

4.To the writer's knowledge, in all of the cases in which the doctrine was applied,

the question involved was whether the court of review should consider errors not raised

in the trial court for the purpose of reversing or affirming. The application of the
doctrine in the instant case, for de purpose of determining what should be the final
disposition of the case on appeal, is clearly distinguishable as a different application of
the doctrine.
5.Note (1927) 40 HARv. L. Rav. 997.
6. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not
Properly Raised and Preserved (1931) 7 Wis. L. REv. 91, 93.
7. That this is the only valid reason to support the rule becomes apparent if the
basic purpose of the courts-to settle disputes according to the correct substantive law
-is kept in mind. Cutting short the litigation before the proper result is obtained
cannot be justified solely on the ground of the undesirability of protracted litigation.
(218)
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trial tactics." Insofar as the question, upon reversing, of dismissal versus
new trial is concerned, an appellee's failure to object must be deemed an
inadvertent rather than a deliberate omission.9 And the rule of the instant
case imposes an extremely harsh penalty for such inadvertance. The rule
may be further questioned in light of the general policy of courts of review
in determining whether, upon reversing, the complaint should be dismissed
or a new trial granted.' 0 The policy generally adopted is to make such
a disposition as justice requires-justice in this regard connoting the merits
of the case as judged by the correct substantive law." The instant case is
clearly out of line with such a criterion, and indicates a throwback to the
outworn judicial attitude that an action at law is essentially a game of
procedural rules.
Corporations-Exemption of Wholly Owned Subsidiary Mines
From Bituminous Coal Act-Keystone Mining Company, the petitioner, is a wholly-owned coal-producing subsidiary of the Delaware,
Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company. Keystone sold all of its
coal to the railroad company at net cost. Keystone requested an order
from Gray, Director of the Bituminous Coal Division, Department of
Interior, exempting it from sections 4 ' and 4A 2 of the Bituminous Coal
Act of 1937 3 by reason of the provision in Section 4, pt. II (1) which
The very existence of the appellate system is a recognition that litigation should be
prolonged if the case has not been correctly decided. Likewise the feeling of fairness
towards trial courts cannot be considered a sufficient reason for a rule which produces
such a result. The reason must be found in some conduct of a litigant which should
be discouraged, and which justifies the refusal to give him any relief from an erroneous
ruling. That the courts have such an idea in mind is indicated by the fact that they
refuse to consider questions not raised and preserved even where to do so would result
in the affirmance of a judgment. The other suggested reasons for the rule would seem
to require the consideration of such questions where to do so will result in affirmance.
8. Even in this application, the rule is at best a rough and ready solution and
covers cases of inadvertent failure'as well as deliberate failure to object. It might
well be argued that the penalty which the rule imposes is too harsh a one for an inadvertent failure to object. That the courts recognize this fact is indicated by the broad
discretion they exercise in dealing with the rule. For a discussion of the various situations in which the courts do not apply the rule, see Campbell, mtpra note 6, at 173.
9. To say that the rule of the instant case will prevent the fruition of a deliberate
manoeuver by the appellee, we must attribute to him a prophetic power which would
enable him to foresee that he would be successful on the trial despite the prejudicial
error to which he has failed to object, that the other party would successfully appeal,
and that he could then obtain a new trial because of the error.
io. The final disposition on appeal is within the discretion of the courts of review.
New York has embodied this discretionary power in its Constitution. N. Y. CoNsT.
Art. VI, § 8. Section 8 provides that an appellate court shall "render judgment of
affirmance, judgment of reversal and final judgment upon the right of any or all of
the parties, or judgment of modification thereon according to the law, except where
it may be necessary or proper to grant a new trial or hearing, when it may grant a
new trial or hearing."
ii. Michigan Pipe Co. v. Sullivan County Water Co., igo Ind. I4, 127 N. E. 768
(1920); Life Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brame, 232 Ky. 63, 22 S. W.

(2d) 439 (1929);

Peckinpaugh v. H. W. Noble & Co., 238 Mich. 464, 213 N. W. 859 (1927) ; Widson
v. Phila. R. T. Co., 13 Pa. Super. I68, 172 Atl. 164 (1934). But see Straud v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 17o Ark. 1174, 283 S. W. 36 (1926).
i. BrrumNous CoAL AcT OF 1937, § 4, 50 STAT. 76 (1937), I5 U. S. C. A. §§ 831833 (i939). Provides for the organization of the Bituminous Coal Code and duties of
its members.
2. Id. §4A, 50 STAT. 83 (1937), I5 U. S. C. A. §834 (1939). Concerns intrastate sales affecting interstate commerce, and methods of exemption of coal not subject
to regulation.
3. Declared constitutional in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adldns, 31o U. S.
381 (1940).
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provides exemption for coa[ producers who consume all of their output
themselves. 4 From an order denying the exemption, the mining company

petitioned review.

Held, exemption denied.

Keystone Mining Co. v.

Gray (Bituminous Coal Producers Board for Dist. i, Intervener), n2o
F. (2d) i (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
The Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, a substitute 5 for the unconstitutional Act of 1935,6 was designed to regulate interstate commerce in
bituminous coal by establishing prices and methods of competition, distribution, and marketing. 7 The consumer-producer exemption clause 8
covered situations where coal was mined and used by the same company
and, 'therefore, had no effect on the market." In two previous cases 10
similarly involving the mining of coal by subsidiaries for parent railroad
companies, courts used an agency rationale to apply the consumer-producer exemption clause to such "captive coal" 1 situations. But the exemption apparently was not designed to include this situation. 2 A proposed amendment to widen the exemption clause to include such coal
failed to be included in the Act.1 3 This consideration has been dismissed
by rationalizing that it was not the intent of Congress, in refusing to include
this amendment, to abrogate the law of principal and agent which, it was
assumed, controlled the case.' 4 Moreover, the Act of 1935 specifically
subjected captive coal to regulation '5 and Congress probably, despite the
16
fact that such coal does not directly affect prices on the open market,
intended to do likewise in the Act of 1937. To rule otherwise would
encourage extension of the captive coal situation, reducing even more the
amount of coal available on the open market. It seems reasonable to con4. "The provisions of this section shall not apply to coal consumed by the producer or to coal transported by the producer to himself for consumption by him."
BITuMINous CoAL Acr OF 1937, § 4, pt. II (1), 50 STAT. 83 (1937), 15 U. S. C. A.
§833 (1) (1939).
5. See Senator Vinson's remarks on the introduction of the BIumINous CoAL
OF 1937. 81 CONG. REC. 2030 (1937).
6. BITuMINous COAL Acr OF 1935, 49 STAT. 991 (1935). Held unconstitutional
in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).

AcT

7. For an excellent discussion of the need for and purpose of the Act: Reeder,
Some Problems of the Bituminous Coal Industry (1938) 45 W. VA. L. Q. iog.
8. Note 4 supra.
9. HearingsBefore, the Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce,
U. S. Sen., 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) 22.
io. Consolidated Indiana Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 103
F. (2d) 124 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Powell v. Gray, 114 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. 4th,
194o), aff'd by evenly divided court, 61 S. Ct. 824 (1941).
II. The BITuMINOUS COAL Acr OF 1935 defined captive coal as

"...
all coal
produced at a mine for the consumption of the producer or by a subsidiary or affiliate

thereof

.

"

49 STAT. 1oo8,

§ 19

(1935).

Loc. cit. supra note g.
13. Senator Bulkley offered an amendment to § 4, pt II (I) (see note 4 supra)
12.

to strike out the period after "him" and add ".

. . and for the purpose of this sub-

section the term 'producer' also includes all individuals, partnerships, and corporations
which are found by the Commission upon the effective date of this act, bona fide and
not for the purpose of evading the provisions of this act, to be owned by, or under
common ownership with, a producer, provided such a producer does not sell any part
of his production on the commercial market". 8i CONG. REC. 3136 (937).
Senator Bulkley went on to add that the purpose of this amendment was to include under the exemption coal produced by a wholly-owned subsidiary.
This amendment was rejected. H. R. REP. No. 578, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (I937)
I, 8.
14. Consolidated Indiana Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 103
F. (2d) 124, 130 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
15. The definition of captive coal (note II supra) was employed for the purpose
of including it under the scope of regulation.
I6. Powell v. Gray, 114 F. (2d) 752, 754 (C. C. A. 4th, 194o).
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It
clude that Congress considered this possible extension undesirable.
was realized that the inclusion of captive mines under the Act would give
them the discouraging alternative of either paying increased corporation
income taxes or the penalty tax for not joining the code." The court in
the instant case has properly interpreted the exemption clause and its
decision gives captive coal no advantage that warrants extension of the
situation.

Criminal Law-Instruction to Jury Concerning Possibility of
Parole in First Degree Murder Case as Reversible Error-jury,
charged by statute I with the duty of imposing the penalty of life imprisonment or death in first degree murder cases, after lengthy deliberation came
into court and submitted to the trial court in writing the question whether
a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment could be paroled. The court,
in defendant's presence and with assent of counsel for both parties,
answered "Yes." The jury returned a first degree verdict with the death
penalty. Held (two justices dissenting), court's action was prejudicial
error.

Sukle v. People, iii

P. (2d) 233 (Colo. 1941).

The issue which divided this court was whether a jury charged with
the imposition of sentence has a right to know what effect parole may have
upon that sentence.2 Most of the courts which have ruled upon this point4
say that it does." In the instant case the appellate court on its own motion
took cognizance of the trial judge's action, holding it was "highly improper"
because it "encouraged the jury to speculate" on what an administrative
the law under which the judiofficer, acting under authority "apart from
ciary proceeds", might do in the future. 5 The dissenting opinion stated
17. Keystone Mining Co. v. Gray, supra at 5.

18. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Cominerce,
U. S. Sen., 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (,937) 24.
I. 2 CoLO.AN~. STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 1930) § 1753. "The jury before which
any person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall, if it find such person guilty thereof, designate by its verdict whether it shall be murder of the first or second degree,
and if murder of the first degree, the jury shall in its verdict fix the penalty to be suffered by the person so convicted, either at imprisonment for life at hard labor in the
penitentiary, or at death; and the court shall thereupon give sentence accordingly." For

a discussion of similar statutes in other States, see Notes (1922) 17 A. L. R. 1117
(1933) 87 A. L. R. 1362.
2. In the instant case the instruction could have had no effect upon the question

of guilt, and affected only the question of punishment.
3. State v. Barth, 114 N. J. L. 11, 176 Atl. x83 (1935) ; Liska v. State, 115 Ohio
St. 283, 152 N. E. 667 (1926) ; State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P. (2d) 542 (937),
51 HARV. L. REv. 353. Contra: Houston v. Commonwealth, 27o Ky. 125, 109 S. W.
(2d) 45 (1937) ; Postell v. Commonwealth, 174 Ky. 272, 192 S.W. 39 (1917). Sometimes cited contra, but distinguishable: People v. Bruno, 49 Cal. App. 372, 193 Pac.
51, (ig2o); Glenday v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 313, 74 S. W. (2d) 332 (934);
Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 637, 178 S.E. 797 (935).
4. "Where the error is so prejudicial that it would have been incurable if objected
to below, reversal is seldom denied." Note (1941) 54 HARv. L. Ray. 1204, citing
People v. Caldwell, 55 Cal. App. 280, 203 Pac. 440 (1921) ; State v. Cook, 162 N. C.
586, 77 S. E. 759 (1913) ; Thomas v. State, 36 Okla. Cr. 209, 253 Pac. 514 (1927).
5. Sukle v. People, iii P. (2d) 233, 235 (Colo. 1941). The only authority cited
by the court was Polly v. People, 107 Colo. 6, 11, io8 P. (2d) 220, 222 (1940) (in-

volving a purported statement to defendant by one of the prosecutor's staff that the
trial court could grant probation), where it was stated: "The court rightly advised
the jury that whether probation could be granted in the case had no bearing upon the
issues." It is of interest that this opinion was written by Judge Otto Bock, who wrote
the dissenting opinion in the instant case and apparently did not consider his earlier
opinion authority for the majority's proposition.
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that the jury, since it had sole responsibility for fixing the punishment,'
should have the assistance of the trial court in determining the quantum of
punishment involved in its decision.7 These two opinions fairly state the
minority and majority views.8 The majority view receives additional support from the circumstance that most courts permit the prosecutor to mention parole possibilities in addressing the jury.9 In practice the minority
view is of doubtful value in safeguarding defendant's interests, for where
a requested instruction concerning parole was refused in one case the jury
promptly returned a death verdict.' 0 It has been suggested that in answer
to a query concerning parole the court should state that the jury should
not speculate on such matters,"- and a distinction has been drawn between
information volunteered in the charge and information responsive to a
query. 12 In any event, it is doubtful whether the defendant's interests are
served by leaving the jury to apply its own limited knowledge of parole
laws, and the fact of this common knowledge cannot be overlooked. The
jury cannot reasonably be denied information concerning the effect of parole
upon the sentence it imposes.'
This information should come from the
trial judge at the time of his charge, before speculation, based either upon
remarks of counsel or common knowledge of parole methods, gives it undue
importance in the jury's mind.
Federal Jurisdiction-Jurisdiction Over Dispute Between Receivers of Insolvent Insurance Company Appointed in Different StatesMichigan Insurance Corporation, in absorbing Iowa Insurance Company,
agreed to retain on deposit securities entrusted to the Iowa Commissioner
of Insurance by the Iowa company.' Later, pursuant to statutory provisions, the Michigan court appointed the Michigan Commissioner of Insurance receiver of the Michigan corporation. Thereafter, the Iowa court
appointed the Iowa Commissioner as receiver of the corporation. The
latter receiver instituted action in the federal court to determine who was
6. Under a verdict of first degree murder, "it is the exclusive province of the jury
to fix the penalty." Demato v. People, 49 Colo. 147, 156, 1ii Pac. 703, 706 (191o).
7. Sukle v. People, iii P. (2d) 233, 236 (Colo. 1941).
8. Cases cited in note 3.
9. Wechter v. People, 53 Colo. 89, 124 Pac. 183 (1912); People v. Murphy, 276
Ill. 304, 114 N. E. 6og (1916). Contra: State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139
(1922).

io. Gaines v. Commonwealth,

opinion), cited note 3 supra.
12.

Jones v. State, 161 Ark.

46 S. W. (2d) 75 (1932).
86, 69 P. (2d) 542, 564 (937)
(dissenting

242 Ky. 237,

ii. State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo.

29,

242,

255 S. W. 876 (1923) ; Freeman v. State, 156

Ark. 592, 247 S. W. 51 (1923).

13. State v. Carrigan, 93 N. J. L. 268, io8 Atl. 315 (1919).
i. The securities in question were deposited by the Iowa company to meet reIowA CODE (931)
(Same in 1939 ed.) §§ 8655, 8663:
"§ 8655. The net cash value of all policies in force in any such company

quirements of

being ascertained . . . the officers thereof shall deposit with the commissioner
the amount of the ascertained valuation in the securities specified in section 8737.
"§ 8663. The securities of a defaulting or insolvent company . . . on deposit shall vest in the state for the benefit of the policies on which such deposits
were made, and the proceeds of the same shall, by the court upon final hearing,
be divided among the holders thereof in the proportion of the last annual valuation of the same, or at any time be applied to the purchase of reinsurance for
their benefit."
When the Michigan Corporation absorbed the Iowa company, the Michigan Corporation agreed to retain, these securities on deposit. It may even have been a condition required by the Insurance Commission Qf Iowa before it would consent to
the reinsurance.
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to administer the securities. Held 2 (one judge dissenting), the federal
court is precluded jurisdiction because of the prior action of the Michigan
court. American United Life Insurance Co. v. Fischer, 117 F. (2d) 811
(C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
The instant case sharply focuses the undesirable condition prevailing
as regards the liquidation of insurance companies. It has been held that
although a statutory receiver succeeds to the title of the property of the
defunct corporation, he must bow to local public policy when he seeks to
administer assets in a foreign state.3 In such case, claims made in the
local courts take precedence. The majority, as the first ground for its
holding, followed Clark v. Williard 4 in ruling that title passed to the
Michigan receiver; but then distinguished the case at bar and held that
the Michigan court had exclusive jurisdiction because here there was no
local policy to be enforced. That such a local policy does exist in Iowa
would seem an inescapable conclusion after a consideration of the views
of the Iowa courts " as well as from the fact that the securities were
deposited for the protection of the policyholders of the Iowa company.8
The second ground for decision was that there was in effect a controversy
between two state courts and such,conflict could not be settled by a federal
The court in the instant case reversed the lower federal court.
3. This doctrine is affirmed in the leading case of Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S.
2.

211 (1935), where Mr. Justice Cardozo held that "Every state has jurisdiction to

determine for itself the liability of property within its territorial limits to seizure
and sale under the process of its courts . . . All that Montana does by the decree
under review is to impose upon such ownership the lien of judgments and executions in conformity with local law . . . He [the statutory successor] must submit,
as must they, [the dissolved corporation or a voluntary assignee] to the mandate of
the sovereignty that has the physical control of what he would reduce to his pos-

session."
The dogma received excellent discussion in Note

(935)

98 A. L. R. 35r. Con-

taining valuable material also are Mulder and Solomon, Effect of the Chandler Act
Upon General Assignments and Compositions (939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 763, 776;
Laughlin, The Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers (1932) 45 Hxv. L. REv. 429;
Note (1934) 2o IowA L. REv. 113; Note (1932) 3o MicH. L. R~v. 1322, 1329, in
which the editor comments "Logically, it is difficult to see how, with certain exceptions, a legislature any more than a court can confer upon a receiver any title,
except to property within the state, whereby he can demand as of right extraterritorial recognition, and, apparently, this is the view adopted by the state courts.
A receiver seeking admittance thereto, though he has title, must still abide by the
rule of comity with all its limitations." In referring to the exceptions the editor
of this note cites Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222 (i88o), which is cited by the majority in the instant case as authority for the proposition that the statutory receiver
secures title to all of the assets wherever situated. Relfe v. Rundle is repudiated in
Schloss v. Metropolitan Surety Co., 149 Iowa 382, 128 N. W. 384 (0910), where
the court holds "On this case, and other cases expressly following it, counsel
seek to define some peculiar kind of receivership which shall not be subject to the
rule of the courts of this state that a foreign receiver can not claim the funds of
the company as against local creditors. We do not discover that any of the cases
relied upon support such a definition." In First, ExtraterritorialPowers of Receivers
(1932) 27 IL. L. REV. 271, it is .held regarding Relfe v. Rundle that "A state may
not as a matter of right pass title to property outside of the state even though the

statute creating the entity purports to be able to do so."
The RESTATEmENT, ComrLicr OF LAws (1934) §546, comment e,

however,

seems to favor a contrary rule. The American Law Institute may have reached
its decision because it is a more desirable rule, yet as pointed out, especially in Clark
v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (I935), decided after the Restatement was published, the

prevailing rule is otherwise.

4. 294 U. S. 211 (935), cited note 3 supra.
5. Schloss v. Metropolitan Surety Co., 149 Iowa 382, 128 N. W. 384 (I9IO),
which is cited by the Iowa court in Watts v. Southern Surety Co. of N. Y., 216
Iowa i5O, 248 N. W. 347 (I933).
6. See note i supra.

See note 14 infra.
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court.7 In answer to this, the dissenting judge contended that "Since the
Iowa court is not attempting to administer assets as such, but merely to
enforce specific local liens, . . .",8 the federal court under Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins ' should act as an Iowa court. While it is true that there is
no conflict here between two state courts, 10 yet there is still reason for the
ruling that the federal court could not assume jurisdiction here. Erie R.
R. v. Tompkins decided merely that federal courts were to apply state
law in cases not governed by the Constitution or Acts of Congress. This
ruling, therefore, cannot be cited as authority for the holding that the federal court would be acting as an Iowa court and as such could take jurisdiction over the controversy. The federal court remains a federal court
and cannot take jurisdiction in a matter that has been drawn into the jurdiction of the Iowa court, a competent court of concurrent jurisdiction."
Until federal legislation such as the Bankruptcy Act provides for unified
liquidation, 12 it should seem that the Iowa court should administer the
securities whether we have here a question of a lien 13 or a prohibition
7. This conclusion is reached by the court on the basis of its holding that "The
Michigan court, on April 12, 1938, acquired jurisdiction over all the property and
business in the actual and constructive possession of the Michigan Company, and the
exclusive right to determine all controversies respecting such property and business,

since no other court had then taken possession of any of the assets of the Company." American United Life Insurance Co. v. Fischer, 117 F. (2d) 811, 817 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1941).

A review of the cases cited by the court for this and similar propositions reveals
that the instant case is to be sharply distinguished from those cited. In most of
these cases, the courts involved were courts of concurrent jurisdiction-a federal
court in the state where the assets were located; this quotation from Farmers Loan
& Trust Co. v. Lake St. Elec. Ry., 177 U. S. 51, 61 (i9oo) quoted in Palmer v.
Texas, 212 U. S. 118, 129 (I9o9) is representative of what is said in the other
cases: "'The possession of the re, vests the court which has first acquired jurisdiction with the power to hear and determine all controversies relating thereto, and for

the time being, disables other courts of coordinate jurisdiction from exercising a

like power.'" This court holds also that the property need not be actually seized in
order for the court to acquire jurisdiction. It is this latter thought that leads the
instant court to hold that the Michigan court had jurisdiction. It will not be contested that the Michigan court could pass title to the securities to the Michigan
receiver, but it could pass only an encumbered title; moreover, to say that the
Michigan court could pass title is not equivalent to saying that it had jurisdiction
over the res. While actual possession is not necessary, it is essential that the res be
within the territorial limits of the court's jurisdiction. The case holding otherwiseIssaacs v. Hobbs Tie and Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734 (I93I), cited in Marcell v.
Engebretson, 74 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 8th, I934)-is based on an application of
the Bankruptcy Act and hence distinguishable. (What is meant by constructive possession in the cases cited is such control as vests in the court over property in its
territorial limits when the legal proceedings are instituted.) It may be concluded
therefore that the Michigan court never acquired jurisdiction over the securities.
8. American United Life Insurance Co. v. Fischer, 117 F. (2d) 811, 821 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1941).

9. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.
law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern." Erie R. R.
U. S. 64 (1938).
io. See note 7 supra.
II. Ibid.
12.

An excellent article on this subject is Legis.

(940)

89 U.

by Acts of ConAnd whether the
or by its highest
v. Tompkins, 304

OF PA.

L.

REv. 92.

13. Whether there was a lien was a problem upon which the majority and the

dissent disagreed. Without delving into the technicalities of this problem, it may
certainly be held that the Iowa Commissioner held such interest-termed a trust in
State v. American Bonding & Casualty Co., 2o6 Iowa 988, 221 N. W. 585 (1928)as would present merely a local problem and so keep the ease within the Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins rule. The statute, cited note I supra, refers to the securities
vesting in the state. This may mean that title vests in the state when the securities
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because of public policy. 1 The fact that the Iowa representative chose
to settle the dispute in the federal court is regrettable, 15 since his remedy
would have lain better in his own state.'8
Labor Law-Certification Power of New York State Labor Board
Where There is a Collective Bargaining Contract with a Renewal
Clause-Plaintiff and A. F. of L. union signed a three-year dosed
shop agreement, automatically renewed unless either manifested intention
to terminate, which neither did. State Labor Board granted petition of
C. I. 0. union (filed day before renewal clause was effective) for election
to redetermine employees' representative. Before election plaintiff and
A. F. of L. union signed a new contract. C. I. 0. won election. Plaintiff
refused to negotiate with C. I. 0., and Board ordered them to do so.
Plaintiff sought to vacate Board's order.' Held (three justices dissenting), for plaintiff, there was a valid contract in existence and Board could
not certify a representative different than the one a party to the contract.
Triboro Coach Corporation et al. v. State Labor Relations Board et al.,
286 N. Y. 314, 36 N. E. (2d) 315 (1941).
The problem of the effect of an existing dosed shop contract upon
the power of the State Labor Board to certify a representative union illustrates the need for a reconsideration of the integrity of the contract in
are deposited or it may mean that title to the securities vests only when the corporation becomes insolvent. In the latter case, a further problem arises as to whether
the Michigan court's decision that the corporation was insolvent would enable title
to pass automatically in Iowa to the Iowa Commissioner of Insurance; or whether
title could pass in Iowa only when the Iowa court decided that the corporation was
insolvent. The lower federal court was of the former view, the Iowa court held
the latter opinion. It would seem best, then, to hold as did the court in the case of
State -v. American Bonding & Casualty Co. that the fund was a trust fund created
by the corporation "'for the protection of the policyholders of said company.'"
14. It cannot be denied that the statute aimed at the protection of the policyholders. In view of the opinion expressed in Schloss v. Metropolitan Surety Co.,
149 Iowa 382, 128 N. W. 384 (igio), it cannot be refuted successfully that the policy
of Iowa is to permit creditors proving locally to have precedence over a foreign
statutory receiver. It seems clear also that the Iowa Commissioner was the representative of the policyholders of the original Iowa Company; and as such that he
held the securities for the benefit of these policyholders, who are creditors. Therefore, there is a sufficient color of public policy for application of the rule of Schloss
v. Metropolitan Surety Co. which provides that "The well-settled rule in this state
is that the claim of a foreign receiver to funds of the corporation found in this
state will not be recognized even by way of comity if the result would be to relegate
the creditors of the corporation in this state to the relief to which they would be
entitled in a foreign jurisdiction, wIhen there are funds of the corporation in the
state from which such claims may be satisfied."
15. This is by no means an indication of approval for diversified liquidation;
but as the law stands such is the conclusion to be drawn.
16. Had the Iowa Commissioner held the assets, the Michigan Commissioner
would have had to sue in the Iowa courts to secure possession. The Iowa Court
would have applied the doctrine of Schloss v. Metropolitan Surety Co., 149 Iowa
382, 128 N. W. 384 (I91o), cited note 12 supra. The Michigan Commissioner could
have appealed from the Iowa Supreme Court to the United States Supreme Court
on the grounds that the Iowa court was not giving "full faith and credit" to the
Michigan statute which provided for the dissolution of the Michigan corporation.
The Supreme Court, however, would probably have applied the doctrine of Clark
v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935), cited note 2 supra. So that the Iowa Commissioner would have been permitted to administer the assets for the benefit of the policyholders of the original Iowa company.
I. 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 1013 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (Order granting application to set aside
State Labor Board order and denying cross application for an order enforcing such
an order), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 636, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 83 (2d Dep't 194i). This is
the first case to present this problem under the New York Act.
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regard to labor law.2 This case raises the question whether the operation
of the above type of contract and the statutory freedom to select a bargaining representative are mutually exclusive. Previous cases suggest
that they are not.3 Analysis of the factual situation reveals that the majority opinion stressed the importance of contractual integrity somewhat
at the expense of the legislative policy 4to diminish industrial unrest; ignoring that the original contract was made before the plaintiff had any
employees or a franchise to operate, when the A. F. of L. was the only
union in the field, and that a three-year, automatically renewable, collective bargaining contract was a deviation from the Board's policy of
one year contracts. 5 The majority opinion found little significance in the
signing of a new contract shortly before the election, stating that if the
new contract should not be valid the automatically renewed contract still
bound the employees. 6 At this point the legislative freedom of election of
representatives can be weakened seriously by not permitting the Board to
order an election. By inaction the employer and previously chosen representative can defeat the employees' freedom of representation by continuing the contract through the renewal clause. In this situation-employees bound by renewed contract-forbidding the Board to certify a new
representative leaves the strike as the alternative, as admitted by the majority opinion 7 which nevertheless professes to further the legislative desire
for industrial peace. The dissent recognized the need to adjust the concept of contractual integrity to labor law for the purpose of insuring
2. Rice, The Legal Significavce of Labor Contracts under the National Labor
Relations Act, Part III: Effect of Change of Conditions on a Statutory Contract

(1939) 37 MIcH. L. REv. 693, 711.

3. The instant case presents a solution to the problem that differs from that found
in previously decided cases involving related factual situations. Because the New
York Act is similar to N. L. R. A. holdings concerning the National Act are relevant
for purposes of analogical reasoning. Cf. Showers Bros. Co., Inc., 13 N. L. R. B. 829
(1939) ; Colonie Fibre Co., Inc., 9 N. L. R. B. 658 (1938) (Both petitions were filed
after the date for termination notice, consequently, the contracts were renewed, but the
N. L. R. B. refused to dismiss the petitions for election) ; New England Transportation Co., i N. L. R. B. 130 (936) (Contained the suggestion that one union may replace another under all the provisions of an existing contract). Also compare opposite views of the court: "However, there is nothing in this right of union members to
select a new bargaining representative which would impair the sanctity of the obligations of the existing contract while that contract was still in force." [Majority opinion, 286 N. Y. 314, 322, 36 N. E. (2d) 315, 318 (394I).] "Though the Statute in
express terms sanctions contracts with a closed shop provision if made with authorized representatives of the employees, it does not, at least in express terms, prohibit the
employees from choosing new representatives during the term of the contract . ..
We cannot read into the statute any implied exception when a valid contract for a
closed shop has been made." [Minority opinion, 286 N. Y. 334, 343, 36 N. E. (2d)
315, 327 (I94I).] See (I94i) 43 COL. L. REv. 524.
4. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, Cum. Supp. 1937) c. 32, § 700.
5.The majority attitude of concern over State Labor Board's activity as endangering contractual stability was in part unfounded for the Board had considered the
stability aspect in dealing with the problem of changing representatives, and in a previous case announced that in regard to the more usual short term (one year) contract the ". . . change of collective bargaining agency would seriously impair the
stability of employer-employee relationships . . ." and ". . . the very purpose of
the Act might be defeated if they (contracts) were not given a reasonable measure
of continuity and protection." Crystal Cab Corp., N. Y. S. L. R. B. Decision 51
(1938) 7, 8; cf. Metropolitan Life [ns. Co. v. N. Y. S. L. R. B., 280 N. Y. 194, 2o6, 20
N. E. (2d) 390, 395 (1939) ("The defined purposes of the Act do not countenance
a limitless power of the Board to permit employees to change bargaining representative for any reason at any moment.")
6. 286 N. Y. 314, 320, 36 N. E. (2d) 315, 316 (I94I).
7. Id. at 322, 36 N. E. (2d) at 318.
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employees their right to bargain through an agent of their choice; s so
that the right would not be made inoperative merely by the existence of
a dosed shop contract. The dissent realized the detrimental effect that
may be produced by an unstable labor contract (undoubtedly thinking of
the labor-harassed employer). It suggested that the Board balance the
social utilities-stability of contracts as opposed to industrial peace-by
recognizing the existence of the contract as a factor, 9 sometimes even the
controlling factor, in the wise determination of representatives, rather
than completely to protect the integrity of the contract at the expense of
the legislative freedom of selection of representatives, and the possible
result of a strike to settle such representation controversies.

Labor Law-".Lawfulness" of Purpose of Peaceful Picketing as
a Prerequisite for Constitutional Protection-Upon employer's justified refusal to renew all-union shop agreement (under Wisconsin statute I
making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to sign an all-union
shop agreement except where at least three-fourths of the employees have
voted in favor of it),2 union called a strike and picketed employer, advertising that both employer and employees were unfair to organized labor.
Held, the Board's "cease and desist" order 3 was proper; constitutional
8. See N. Y. CoNs. LAw (Cahill, Cum. Supp. z937) c. 32, §§ 705 (3), 702 (7)
(First section gives employees a right to change their choice and creates the duty of
the State Labor Board to investigate when a petition is properly filed, and the second
section creates the Board's duty to determine the life of the representative.)
9. The view of the State Labor Board, prior to this decision, was desirable. The
basic stability of contractual obligations was recognized as necessary in order to prevent an emasculation of the right of the majority of workers to have their collective
bargaining contract effectively operate. The Board handled satisfactorily the problem
of associating the need for stability of a collective bargaining contract with the somewhat conflicting principle of freedom to select representatives for the majority of the
employees by propounding a flexible principle that after an existing contract had
operated for a reasonable period a new investigation may be required. Premier Linen
Supply Co., N. Y. S. L. R. B. Decision 738 (1939) 4.

§ ili.o6: "What are unfair labor practices.
(I) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . :
(c) To encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . by
discrimination in regard to hiring . . .; provided that an employer shall not be prohibited from entering into an all-union agreement . . . where three-quarters or more
of the employees .. . . shall have voted . . . in favor of such all-union agreement
in a referendum conducted by the board."
Another section of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act is now being challenged
before the Supreme Court: Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. W. E. R. B., 236 Wis.
329, 295 N. W. 634 (ig4i), cert. granted, IO U. S. L. WEEIC 3111 (U. S. i94I).
The constitutionality of the whole act is being challenged in another case. Allen
Bradley v. W. E. R. B., 237 Wis. 164, 295 N. W. 791 (194I), juris. noted, io U. S. L.
WEEK 3111 (U. S. 1941).
2. "The vote was 118 against and 74 for the all union provision."
Instant case,
at 33.
3. "I. Cease and desist froma. . . . attempting to compel the complainant . . . by picketing its plant . . .
to enter . . into a . . . contract . . . containing an all union . . . shop provision.
b ....
attempting to compel the complainant to interfere with its employees in
the exercise of their legal right to refrain from being subject to . . . an all union
. shop provision.
c. Publicly asserting that the complaint is unfair to organized labor . . . unless
such charge is based upon some reason other than . . . an all union . . . shop provision." Instant case, at 37n.
i. Wis. STAT. (1939)
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protection of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does not
extend to picketing the purpose of which is unlawful. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Milk and Ice Cream Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, Local No. 225, 299 N. W. 31 (Wis. 1941).
The dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute now comes within that liberty of communication secured to every
person by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a state. 4
Either peaceful picketing will be fully identified with free speech, 5 or the
Supreme Court, taking notice of the fact that picketing often involves
more than mere communication of facts and constitutes an economic
weapon, will give it a more limited protection. 6 If the former, the doctrine
that the legality of picketing depends upon the lawfulness of its purpose7
will necessarily be discarded 8 since it seems difficult to transfer the doctrine of unlawful objective from strikes to free speechf Further, under
the rigorous "clear and present danger" test' 0 applied in civil liberty
cases" a state will not be able to forbid all peaceful picketing, 12 or
even to restrict the privilege to union members, 1 or to employees, 14 or to
4. A. F. L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941), 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 825; Thornhill
v. Alabama, 38o U. S. 88 (1940); see Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 297 (1g4i) ; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 3o1 U. S.
468, 478 (1937).
5. See Feinberg, Picketing, Free Speech and "Labor Disputes" (894o) I7 N. Y.

U. L. Q. 385.
6. See i TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLEcTIVE BARGAINING (1940) § 137 et seq.
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (8939) § 784 et seq.; i TELLER, LABoR Dispsums AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940) § 84 et seq.; it was generally said that the lawfulness of
the strike and/or picketing depended upon the lawfulness of its purpose. Cf.
FURTER AN]) GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930)

FRANK-

24.

8. While A. F. L. v. Swing involved picketing for the closed shop the question
never was before the Supreme Court since the closed shop has always been a lawful
purpose in Illinois; Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912). The
Meadownoor case involved a secondary boycott but the question of purpose was not
mentioned. But see Senn v. Tile Layers, 301 U. S. 468, 480 (1937).
q. See note 7 supra.
io. The test was laid down by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47,
52 (8919); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (894o), (1941) 89 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 5,5; Herndon v. Lowry, 30 U. S. 242 (937); see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U. S. 88, 804 (894o). Note (941) 29 CALIF. L. REV. 375.
ii. Generally a presumption of constitutionality attaches to state statutes; U. S.
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938). But the Supreme Court does
not apply it in civil liberty cases; see Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939) ;
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452 (1938) ; U. S. v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938). And each statute is tested on its face; Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (938).
Nor
can the state rely in its control of the streets to curtail free speech; Schneider v. State,
308 U. S. 147 (1939) ; Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
12. See cases cited note 4 supra. But under its police power a state may regulate
picketing as an exercise of free speech; see A. F. L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 325
(94), 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 825; Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 297 (8940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 105 (894o) ; and
see notes io and ii supra.

13. This raises the problem of picketing in the absence of a labor dispute which is
not within the scope of this note.
r4. A. F. L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (194); with which compare Borden v.
Local No. 133, 152 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (attempt to distinguish the
Swing case on the ground that it did not involve any statutory violation).
This would seem to extend to picketing by a defeated union. Contra: Euclid Candy
v. Summa, 174 Misc. 19, 89 N. Y. S. (2d) 382 (8940); Bloedel Donovan Lumber
Mills v. International Woodworkers, 4 Wash. (2d) 62, lo2 P. (2d) 270 (1940) (in-

junction against picketing by a defeated union). The courts tend to hold that there
is no labor dispute once the victorious union has been certified.
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a majority of employees.15 But the well-recognized limitations of freedom
of speech 16 would apply; thus the urging of crimes,' 7 and probably of
other unlawful acts as well,' 8 is not privileged. Therefore the reasoning
of the court is not without logic 19 and the device consisting of making the
20
union's goal unlawful seenis an effective indirect restriction of picketing,
for it can hardly be doubted that a state can constitutionally ban the allunion shop contract.2 1 But to the reasoning of the court it might be objected that the pickets were merely asking the public to exercise its privilege not to patronize the employer, and that the ultimate purpose of the
pickting should be immaterial 22 since the public is a free agent.2 3 Moreover the union might properly picket for the purpose of inducing the
rebellious employees to change their minds, 2 4 a lawful purpose since they
may lawfully vote in favor of the all-union shop.25 The court's statement
that picketing which is unlawful is not constitutibnally protected 2 6 begs
the question for the validity of state action cannot be judged by state standards of lawfulness, 2 7 but will depend upon the extent to which the Supreme
Court will identify peaceful picketing with free speech.
Master and Servant-Musicians as Employees of Restaurant
Owner under Unemployment Compensation Act-Unemployment
Compensation Commission sued restaurant owner for contributions allegedly due by virtue of his employment of certain dance bands. Held (one
I5.A. F. L. v. Bain, io6 P. (2d) 544 (Ore. 1940) ; Note (i94o) 9 GEo. WASH.
L. R v. 185. Contra: Hotel & Rest. Employees v. W. E. R. B., 236 Wis. 329, 295
N. W. 634 (1941), cert. granted, ioU. S. L. WEEK 3111 (U. S. 194).
16. See Willis, Freedom.of Speech and of the Press (1929) 4 IND. L. J. 445.
17. Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 276 (1915).
18. This might include unfair labor practices, torts and breaches of contract. See
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S.147, 161 (1939).
ig. This is true only insofar as the court relies on the proposition that inciting
to an unlawful act is not privileged. It is not true of its broader proposition that
picketing which is unlawful (according to standards set by the state itself?) is not
constitutionally protected.
2o. This was forecast to some extent by the writer of a note; Note (i94o) Wis.
L. Rav. 272, 285, n. 64. But the device would seem to be of rather limited application
since there are few labor "goals" which can thus be made unlawful by statute. Moreover the court might very well look through it and render it ineffective by holding
that the pickets are merely asking the public to exercise its privilege not to buy.
21. The closed shop agreement may be viewed as a restraint upon the individual's
freedom to contract rather than an exercise thereof, and a state could presumably
proclaim a policy adverse to such restraints and make such agreements unlawful by
statute. Nor could the union validly contend that it is being deprived of a valuable
"property right" (the right to enter into such agreements in the future?) without due
process of law.
22. Feinberg, loc. cit. supra note 5.
23. Is the urging of "urging of unfair labor practices" not privileged? Quarre.
24. Under the court's reasoning the union would probably have to make clear that
its purpose is not to compel the employer to sign irrespective of the employees' vote,
but rather to have the employees change their minds, thus enabling the employer lawfully to sign the agreement; a rather thin factual distinction.
Statements that the employees are unfair should be permitted, but not statements
that the employer is unfair (see note 3 supra) since such would be deliberately untrue,
or at best greatly misleading; the union had no bona fide dispute with the employer
but solely with the employees (or with the statute itself).
25. It cannot be denied that the practical result would be the same as if the union
were allowed to picket the employer; and some hardship might result, but certainly no
more than under the Szwin case allowing picketing by non-employees. As to the ineffectiveness generally of the device see note 2o supra.
26. Instant case, at 39.
27. Cf. Borden v. Local No. 133, 152 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941),
cited note I4 suprl; with which compare A. F. L. v. Bain, io6 P. (2d) 544 (Ore.
1940).
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justice dissenting), restaurant owner not liable as musicians were not his
employees under Unemployment Compensation Act, but employees of their
leaders, who were independent contractors. Unemployment Compensation
Commission of Wyoming v. Mathews, iii

P. (2d) iii

(Wyoming, I94I).

The Wyoming Unemployment Compensation Act provides that any
employment is subject to the unemployment tax, unless three factors concurrently exist: freedom from control, performance outside place or course
of employer's business, and an established independent vocation.' The
basic problem before the court in the instant case was whether this provision is intended to codify the common law concept of independent contractor (and consequently to relieve an employer from liability for the
tax when that relationship exists), or is intended to define a novel class
of individuals who alone are to be considered "employers" for the purposes
of the Act.2 The common law definition of an independent contractor was
laid down with reference to the doctrine of vicarious liability. It stresses
the absence of control,3 an element properly considered in determining the
employer's liability for his employee's torts. 4 On the other hand, the
declared purpose of the Wyoming statute 5 indicates that an employer's
x. Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1940) c. 63, art. 4, § 63-402 (i) "Services performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to be employment subject to
this Act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that(A) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his contract of service and
in fact; and
(B) such service is either outside the usual course of the business for which
such service is performed or that such service is performed outside of all the places
of business of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and
(C) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business."
39 of the Unemployment Compensation Acts now in force in 51 states and territories contain a provision identical or similar to that quoted above. See Social Security
Board, Analysis of State Unemployment Compensation Laws (1937).
2. Other jurisdictions are divided on the problem. The numerical weight of
authority adopts the view that the statute defines a class which differs from the
common law concept of independent contractor. McKinley v. R. L. Payne & Son
Lumber Co., 20o Ark. 1114, 143 S. W. (2d) 38 (194o); Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 55o, 88 P. (2d) 56o (1939); Schomp et al.
v. Fuller Brush Co., 124 N. J. L. 487, 12 A. (2d) 702 (94o); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. State Unemployment Comp. Comm. et al., lO3 P. (2d) 708 (Ore.
194o). "The most independent of independent contractors therefore 'are not included
* but a class of individuals, who under strict common law concept of independent
contractorship were other than employees, are . . ." Globe Grain & Milling Co. v.
Industrial Comm. et al., 98 Utah 36, 40, 91 P. (2d) 512, 514 (939).
A minority supports the codification theory. Hill Hotel Co. v. Kinney, 138
Neb. 760, 295 N. W. 397 (194o); Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199
Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (i939); Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial
Comm., 233 Wis. 467, 29o N. W. ig (940).
3. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 2 (3). "An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled
by the other nor subject to the ozher's right to control with regard to his physical
conduct in the performance of the undertaking."
4. It is logical that one who is powerless to control another's manner of performing a given task should not be responsible for the latter's tortious conduct in
the course of the performance. On the other hand, where one has a right to exercise such control, it is not unjust to impose upon him the responsibility of seeing
that the work is done with proper regard for the rights of others.
5. Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1940) c. 63, art. 4, § 63-401. "Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare
of the people of this state . . . The achievement of social security requires protection against this great hazard . . . This can be provided . . . by the systematic
accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods
of unemployment."
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liability to insure against unemployment is not founded on the control he
exercises over his employees, but on the theory that the public welfare
demands such insurance." This being the case, it follows that the definition in the statute is intended to make the class of insured employees as
large as practicable.7 Thus, in the fact situation of the instant case, it
would not be inconsistent to hold the restaurant owner liable for the unemployment tax, though he would not be vicariously liable for a tort the
musicians might commit 38 Furthermore, the question of whether the use
of music is in the course of the restaurant business is an open one; 9 and,
as it appears that the engagements herein involved were of sufficient duration that payment of the unemployment tax by the owner would not have
been impracticable, 0 the court's decision does not seem to give full effect
to the statutory purpose. There is need for a clear recognition that the
6. The employer pays contributions because a "systematic accumulation" of funds,
from which benefits may be paid in the event o.f unemployment, is necessary to
achieve social security. Therefore, the employer pays, not because he controls, but
because it is more feasible to have him make contributions for all of his employees
than to look to each individually. In jurisdictions where the employee also contributes to the fund, it is a common practice to collect his contribution through the
employer.
7. "An examination of the pertinent definitions in the . . . Act make it readily
apparent that such words . . . are not used as words of art having rigid, precise,
and restricted meanings, but rather . . . evidencing a legislative intent to give to
the Act a broad and liberal coverage to the end that the far-reaching effects of
unemployment may be alleviated." Unemployment Comp. Com'n v. Jefferson S. L. Ins.
Co., 215 N. C. 479, 483, 2 S. E. (2d) 584, 587, 588 (i939). See Note (i94o) I
WAs H. & LEE L. REV. 232, 243. The Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Act,
which expressly provides the relationship of master and servant as its base, has been
criticized and a narrow construction refused. Rossini v. Tone, 7 Conn. Supp. 13
('939).
8. The owner under his contract with the orchestra leaders did not engage the
orchestra members, nor could he tell them how to play. Thus (barring the possibility of his being liable as a possessor of land) it would not appear just to hold him
responsible for an injury to a third party caused, for example, by the negligence of
a particularly boisterous drummer. The orchestra leader has the right to control the
drummer's performance, not the owner.
However, the state's interest in providing a barrier against the ills of unemployment is a different sort of problem. Regardless of who controls, the state will be
injured if no provision is made against the contingency of unemployment. As a
matter of expediency, it would probably be much more desirable for the state to
look to the owner rather than the orchestra leader for contributions to the unemployment fund. This may appear to work a hardship on the employer. But however small or large the group on which he pays the tax, the actual payments made
can be regarded as one of his costs, ultimately to be passed on to his customers. If
all of his competitors are subject to contributions on the same liberal basis, he will
suffer no hardship.
9. Compare Hill Hotel Co. v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 760, 295 N. W. 397 (1940),
with Rossini v. Tone, 7 Conn. Supp. i3 (939).
It would seem that no general
conclusion can be reached; the particular type of restaurant must determine the issue.
Many night clubs are frequented more because of the dance bands they feature, than
because of the excellence of their cuisine. For a general discussion of the problem
see COmPTON, SocIAL SECURITY PAYROLL TAXES (It4o) 173-176.
io. This seems to be a logical basis for the distinction sometimes made between
"name" and "non-name" orchestras. The former are more or less permanent organizations, travel over the country a great deal, and frequently play engagements of
less than a week. The latter do not travel very extensively, and tend to remain longer
at a given place. In the instant case, the exact length of the engagements does not
appear. The bands were paid on a weekly basis, however, and it seems a safe assumption that their appearances were for a month or longer. On similar engagements
elsewhere the employer paid the contributions for one of the groups; and, as the
leader and the restaurant owner had talked over the matter, and as the state subsequently brought this action, the amount of the tax herein involved must have been
large enough that the employer would not have been justified in contending that it
was too trivial to bother with.
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independent contractor concept is not the proper theory on which to determine liability for unemployment taxes. The conductor of the restaurant
orchestra may be an independent contractor at common law, but the public
concern for his being insured against unemployment is as great as that for
the head waiter.
Suretyship-Debtor's Power to Direct Application of Payment
to Pre-existing Independent Debt-Contractor agreed to construct
highway for state, promising to pay materialmen's claims arising therefrom; performance guaranteed in professional surety's bond. With moneys
received from the job, contractor paid creditor who had furnished cement.
Upon specific direction of contractor, the creditor, aware of the source of
the money, applied payment on a pre-existing debt. Creditor sued surety
for balance due on cement, this being secured by the latter's bond. Held,
payment shall be applied in satisfaction of assured debt. Ash Grove Line
& Portland Cement Co. v. Moran Construction Co., 296 N. W. 761 (Neb.
194').
There is confusion in the decisions where materialmen are beneficiaries
under a bond given to secure performance by a contractor, and the contractor pays a materialman who has furnished material for use in the
performance of the contract guaranteed, but the materialman applies the
payment upon another debt.- At one extreme is a group of decisions2
which hold that a surety can never have the power to direct application.
At the other, is a group of decisions which allow application by the surety
in every instance. 3 Between the two extremes are those decisions which
refuse to allow the surety to direct application of the payments unless the
creditor knew the source of the funds and the existence of the suretyship. 4
The instant case raises the problem of evaluating the effect of a specific
direction by the debtor, at the time payment is made, as to the application
thereof. Although ordinarily the creditor must comply with such direction,5 this court feels that an exception should be made because the surety
has some interest or equity in the funds with which the debtor makes
SURETYSHIP (1931) § 76. For an interesting analysis of the problems
27 MicH. L. REv. 686.
2. Sampson v. Commonwealth, 2o8 Mass. 372, 94 N. E. 473
911) ; People v.
i. ARANT,

concerned see (1929)

Powers, io8 Mich. 339, 66 N. W.

215

(1896); Standard Oil Co. v. Day, 161 Minn.

281, 201 N. W. 410 (1924) ; Mack v. Colleran, 136 N. Y. 617, 32 N. E. 6o4 (1892).
3. Columbia Digger Co. v. Sparks, 227 Fed. 780 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915); Columbia
Digger Co. v. Rector, 215 Fed. 6r8 (W. D. Wash. 1915); Crane Co. v. Pacific Heat
and Power Co., 36 Wash. 95, 78 Pac. 460 (1904) ; Sioux City Foundry v. Merten, 174
Iowa 332, 156 N. W. 367 (I916). The Columbia Digger case, the leading case favoring this view, relies on the Crane case, but the Washington court which decided the

Crane case later changed its ground, and held, contrary to the language of the Crane
case, that the surety could not apply payments unless the creditor had knowledge of
the surety's equity; cf. Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 92 Wash. 52, I58
Pac. 740 (I916), cited note 4 infro.
4. Chicago Lumber Co. v. Douglas, 89 Kan. 308, 131 Pac. 563 (1913) ; Thacker
v. Bullock Lumber Co., 14o Ky. 463, 131 S. W. 271 (191o) ; Salt Lake City v. O'Connor, 249 Pac. 81o (Utah 1926) ; Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 92 Wash.

52, 158 Pac. 740 (1916). These courts seem to feel that the surety's interest is analogous to that of the cestui in a constructive trust, in which the contractor is trustee and
the contract funds comprise the trust res. So, following the analogy, the surety's interest is protected unless cut off by a bona-fide purchase. Perhaps when the exact
question is presented, some of these courts will go further; for example, the Utah court
which in Salt Lake City v. O'Conmwr held that where the creditor had no knowledge
of the suretyship, the surety could not direct application, might go further, and say,
even if there were such knowledge the surety's equity might be ignored.
5. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 72o (U. S. 1824); Allen v. Jones, 8
Minn. 202 (1862).
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payment. Consequently, it permits the surety to insist upon the application of such payments to the discharge of the assured debt. Each building
contract should be made to support itself; the money paid on a certain
contract should discharge the very obligation incurred thereunder. Were
it to permit the creditor's application of payment upon another indebtedness, in the face of his knowledge of the source of the funds, the court
believes it would be giving legal sanction to constructive fraud. But,
"one who becomes a surety takes the risk that honest payment of unsecured
debts may leave a deficiency which the surety must make good." 6 More
cogent is the fact that the contractor might have used the contract money
to pay for a new automobile, whether the vendor knew of the source or
not.7 Or, a prior unrelated debt might have been discharged irrespective
of the source of the funds." The contractor is at liberty to conduct his
own business in his own way. Money received on the contract is his to
spend as he chooses. It seems, then, that he should have the power to
direct application of payments made therewith. In its failure to give effect
to what seems to be the crucial catalytic fact, this court is evincing an
unnatural concern for the surety's equitable interest.
Taxation-Constitutionality of Appropriation Discharging Valid
Special Benefit Assessments-Legislature provided that portion of
money to defray cost of constructing public highway was to be paid by
special assessments 1 against land benefited. 2 By a subsequent statutes
proceeds of gasoline tax allocated to motor vehicle fund were appropriated
to satisfaction of unpaid assessments and reimbursement of those who had
paid the assessments. Pursuant to provisions of statute, a voucher was
presented to the state auditor for payment, and he refused to honor it.
Held, the voucher was properly dishonored since the statute under which
it was presented was unconstitutional. State ex rel. Collier v. Yelle, 115
P. (2d) 373 (Wash. 1941).
It is axiomatic that all taxes shall be levied and collected for public
purposes only.4 A tax laid for private purposes is illegal and void.5 The
state of Washington deems a private purpose to be subserved if the legislature favors a group of debtors by ". . . extinguishing . - . (their)
obligation . . . to the state, or to a municipal corporation therein." 6
The indebtedness of those assessed has been made binding by judicial
decree,7 and from that determination springs a valid legal obligation. That
6. Standard Oil Co. v. Day, 161 Minn. 281, 2o N. W. 4IO (1924), (1925) 38
HARv. L. REv. 99o, ( 25) 25 COL. L. REV. 679.
7. 6 WImsToN, CoNTRAcrs (rev. ed. 1938) § i8o6.
8. Fidelity and Deposit Co. v., Union State Bank, 21 F. (2d) io2 (D. D. Minn.

1927).

i. The assessments were of two kinds; those by way of condemnation, and those
levied for physical improvements.

2. As to what constitutes a legislative finding that the assessed land will be benefited, see Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 3o6 U. S. 459
(1939) 37 MicH. L. REv. 1311.

3. Wash. Laws 1939, c. i81, § 4 (b).

4. The leading cases as to purposes for which taxes may be imposed are: Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 59 Am. Dec. 759 (1853); Citizens' Say. &
Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874). For an excellent article, see
McAllister, Public Purpose it Taxation (1930) I8 CAIUx. L. REv. 137, 241.
5. As to what is private purpose there is much question in the authorities. Cf.
COOLEY, CoNsTiTUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1931) 65.
6. WASH. CONST. Art. II, § 28, Subsection io.
7. In re Aurora Avenue of Seattle, i8o Wash. 523, 41 P. (2d) i43, 96 A. L. R.
1374, 1380 (1935). This decision decided only the validity of the assessments by way
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judgments could be had against the assessees and liens perfected on their
land is the practical test of the validity and certainty of the obligation.
Other taxpayers, as citizens, have an interest in the assessment debts. An
act which destroys this private indebtedness is within the constitutional
prohibition. It is admitted that the state was under no legal obligation
to repay those assessed. Nor does the court feel that the facts admit of
a moral obligation.8 It assumes that every possible objection was urged
against the validity of the assessment, so that the court will not consider
now whether the assessments were unjustly made in excess of the benefits.
Exactly how much of the decision hinges on policy is not ascertainable with
mathematical certainty, but it is clear that this court wants to attach certainty to liability, so that state budgets, contracting parties and bond purchasers, for example, will not be subjected to the vagaries of legislative
indecision. Had the original authorization provided that the entire cost
of the highway was to be appropriated from the motor vehicle fund, there
would have been no dispute as to the power of the legislature to do precisely what is now being prohibited. But the instant court feels that the
validity of the assessments is the crucial factor, rather than any so-called
change of heart by the legislature. It is interesting therefore to speculate
on the result if the appropriation statute had been enacted prior to the
case which tested the validity of the assessments. Would it still be insisted
that a private obligation was being discharged with public funds? Consistency seems to require an affirmative answer. Yet the logical corollary
would then be that the legislature is powerless to change the statute once
it has been enacted. In substance, what might have been done when the
work was ordered, cannot now be done. The legislature may not change
its mind.

Torts-Moral Duty to Aid Others Imperiled Without Defendant's Fault as a Basis for Tort Liability-In action for injuries sustained by six-year-old who accidentally fell at bottom of store escalator,
catching his fingers in the moving parts, evidence tended to show that the
escalator continued to operate for several minutes after the accident (thus
aggravating the injury) because employees working near scene had no
information sufficient to enable them to stop the machinery. Held, failure
to take proper steps to stop the escalator with reasonable promptness after
defendant knew of the plaintiff's peril was a breach of duty. L. S. Ayres
& Co. v. Hicks, 34 N. E. (2d) 177 (Ind. i4i).
In spite of the fact that no antecedent negligence on the part of the
defendant had caused the initial injury in the instant case,' and indeed all
of condemnation. As to the assessments levied for the physical improvements of
Aurora avenue, it is assumed that the statutory procedure governing assessments for
local improvements has been followed.
8. Taxation to raise money to pay a claim on a moral obligation, not enforceable
at law, is for a public purpose. State ex rel. Hart v. Clausen, 113 Wash. 570, 194 Pac.
793, 13 A. L. R. 580 (192I) (relief of war veterans after services have been rendered).
For an extended discussion of this point see i CooLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 194.
i. Instant Case at i81 et seq. The jury, in answer to interrogatories, established
that there was no antecedent negligence on the part of the store in either the construction or operation of the escalator. However, in awarding damages, the store was held
liable, not only for those injuries arising from its purported breach of duty, but also
for those initial injuries concerning which the jury had declared it free from negligence. Judge Bedwell attacks the verdict on damages in a vigorous dissent. Id. at
187.
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ordinary prudence as store-keeper 2 and common carrier 3 had been exercised to prevent it, this decision states that the defendant had nevertheless
breached a duty by failing to inform its clerks, in anticipation of accident,
how to stop the escalator and thereby prevent aggravated injury. No
authority is cited to support this proposition, and its validity is questionable.4 Furthermore, with regard to the court's assertion that the defendant was under a duty, following the accident, to rescue the plaintiff, it may
be said that generally no affirmative duty exists to act for the protection of
those imperiled by risks for which the defendant is not responsible, 5 unless
there is some anterior legal relationship between the parties upon which
the duty may be predicated. The cases cited by the court in attempting to
establish a duty are inapposite because the defendants in them, by their
active conduct, increased the plaintiffs' injuries.7 The court finds support,
2. There was no charge that the defendant had failed to exercise the duty incumbent upon a proprietor of a store to use reasonable care to keep his premises safe for
the protection of his customers. Id. at 181 et seq. Todd v. S. S. Kresge Co., 303 Ill.
App. 89, 24 N. E. (2d) 899 (i939) discusses in detail the duty on proprietors with

regard to such appliances as escalators.
3. The duty imposed by law upon the defendant in operating the escalator is the
same as the duty imposed upon the carrier of passengers by elevator. McBride v.
May Dept. Stores, Inc., 39 Ohio App. 42o, 177 N. E. 773 (ig3i); Hefferman v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 297 Ill. App. 272, 17 N. E. (2d) 523 (938). Such being the case, the
law imposes upon them the same duties as are imposed upon a common carrier with
respect to passengers' safety. Tippecanoe Loan Co. v. Jester, i8o Ind. 357, ioi N. E.
915 (913) ; Ohio Valley Trust Co. v. Wernke, 42 Ind. App. 326, 84 N. E. 99g(igoS).
And that duty is to use the due care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under like circumstances. Union Traction Co. v. Berry, i88 Ind. 514, 121 N. E.
655 (igg). See note i supra.
4. No analogous cases exist that create a duty similar to this, and the dissenting
opinion discusses at length the various inconsistencies of establishing any such duty.
"Liability for injury should arise only from failure to anticipate something which is
likely to happen. It should not arise . . . from failure to anticipate 'what is unlikely to happen. . . . under the situation here existing, the owner of the store, in
the exercise of ordinary care, could not anticipate that an injury was likely to happen,
and . . . there would be no duty upon him to provide attendants . . . to quickly
stop the machinery in time of peril, when a condition producing peril was not likely
to happen." Instant Case at i89.
5. Allen v. Hixson, iii Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 8io (i9oo); Union Pac. R. R. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 Pac. 281 (i9o3); Griswold v. Boston & M. R. R., 183 Mass.
434, 67 N. E. 354 (903) ; CLMuuR, THE LAw OF TORTS (1st ed. 1922) § ioo; Paossm,

(Ist ed. 194) § 32, 192 e seq.; Bohlen, The Moral
Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (908) 56 U. OF PA. REv. 217, 326,
327, 334.
6. A company employing persons to work around moving machinery is required
to see that their superintendent has sufficient knowledge of the machinery to stop it
so as to prevent further injury to an employee caught therein, although this is not due
to any negligence on their part. Raasch v. Elite Laundry Co., 98 Minn. 357, io8 N.
W. 477 (19o6) ; Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172 S. W. 43 (1914) ;
cf. Stager v. Troy Laundry Co., 38 Ore. 48o, 63 Pac. 645 (19oi). "The 'implied contract' which these cases profess to find seems the merest cloak for the obligation of
common humanity." Paossma, op. cit. supra note 5,at 194.
7. E. g., Northern Cent. P. R. v. State, to Use of Price, 29 Md. 42o (i868);
HMA'BOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs

Dyche v. Vicksburg R. R., 79 Miss. 361, 30 So. 711 (igoi); Depue v. Flatau, Ioo
Minn. 299, I1 N. W. i (1907). "In those case [sic] which appear to go farthest

towards recognizing the existence of a legal duty to take positive steps to remove a
peril innocently created or to mitigate an injury innocently caused, there will, in all
but one case, be found to exist some ground for the plaintiff's recovery other than a
breach of humanitarian obligation to care for a fellow man in helpless misfortune.
Either, first, the defendant has not merely failed to assist the plaintiff, but by some
act done with knowledge . . . of his peril, has turned it into an actual injury or
has increased the injury already sustained, or, second, the defendant stood in some
antecedent relation to the plaintiff, which cast upon him the duty of affording to the
latter protection, or, third, the defendant, by voluntarily taking upon himself the
charge of the situation after knowledge of the plaintiff's peril, has, as it were assumed a position of voluntary, though gratuitous, bailee of his safety." Bofilen,
supra note 5, 316-317.
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however, in a lone case 3 that based its decision on a misconception of an
earlier decision." Moreover, there was no present ability to rescue the
victim in the instant case because of the .clerks' ignorance as to how to turn
off the escalator. 10 Not even the strongest advocate of imposing a rescue
duty 11 considered imposing liability upon one who did not, on perceiving
the peril, have a then existing actual ability to prevent further harm.' 2
Although the courts as yet recognize no duty to aid another imperiled without defendant's fault,' 3 this archaic concept, inconsistent with modern
morality, has already been modified in some states by legislation. 4 It is
to be hoped that the courts will soon follow suit.
8. Whitesides v. Southern R. R., 128 N. C. 229, 38 S. . 878 (igoi) held that, if
the servants of the railroad knew or ought to have known that they had knocked a
trespasser from a trestle bridge, they were bound to stop and take care of him. The
court uses little reasoning in its decision, but accepts as authority without much, if any,.
independent investigation the law as stated in BEAcH, CoNxmBuTORY NGLGENcE (3d
ed. x899) §215. (Although meaning to cite Beach, the court actually referred to a
non-existent authority named Black by some accident.)
9. Northern Cent. R. R. v. State, to the Use of Price, 29 Md. 420 (I868), cited
in the Instant Case at 184. Beach wrongly believed that this case supported the existence of a legal duty to aid those whom one has innocently injured, whereas it only
required care of one who voluntarily gave such aid, and the court in the Whitesides
case, in quoting Beach, made the same mistake.
io. In Stager v. Troy Laundry Co., 38 Ore. 48o, 63 Pac. 645 (Igoi) it was held
that, while an employer may possibly be liable if his manager wilfully prolongs the
suffering of an employee, he is not bound to possess himself of technical knowledge of
the machinery with a view to extricate persons from perils to which they may subject
themselves . . . nor to have on the spot someone possessed of such knowledge for
"it is unusual to anticipate accident and to provide for the most speedy relief when such
exigency arises."
ii. Ames, Law and Moralsr (i9o8) 22 HARv. L. REv. 97, 111-113.
12. It is one thing to say that a skillful swimmer who sees a person drowning
should be under a duty to go to his rescue (though the law has not created such a
duty), but it is a vastly different thing to say that a person who cannot swim and who
sees another drowning is liable for his death because of a past failure to learn to swim
and thereby acquire the ability to rescue when the need arose.
13. "If the actor by his tortious conduct has caused such bodily harm to another
as to make him helpless, the actor is under a duty to use reasonable care to prevent any
further harm which the actor then realizes or should realize as threatening the other."
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (934)
§ 322. However, in a Caveat to this section, the Institute expresses no opinion as to the existence or non-existence of a similar duty to aid
when the actor's original conduct is innocent.
14. So-called "hit and run" statutes are in force in many states which require automobilists to stop and aid persons whom the operation of their car has injured irrespective of whether these operations are innocent or negligent, and irrespective of
whether the person injured is or is not guilty of contributory negligence. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, EXPLANATORY NOTES (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1929) i6.

